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How Dispute Resolution System Design Matters:
An Organizational Analysis of Dispute Resolution
Structures and Consumer Lemon Laws*

Shauhin A. Talesh

This study demonstrates how the structure of dispute resolution shapes the
extent to which managerial and business values influence the meaning and
implementation of consumer protection law, and consequently, the extent to
which repeat players are advantaged. My analysis draws from, links, and
contributes to two literatures that examine the relationship between organizational governance structures and law: neo-institutional studies of law and
organizations and socio-legal studies of repeat players’ advantages in disputing.
Specifically, I compare an instance where powerful state consumer protection
laws are resolved in private dispute resolution forums funded by automobile
manufacturers but operated by independent third-party organizations (California) with one where consumer disputes are resolved in public alternative
dispute resolution processes run and administered by the state (Vermont).
Through in-depth interviews and participant observation in the training programs that dispute resolution arbitrators undergo in each state, I show how
different dispute resolution structures operating in California and Vermont
give different meanings to substantially similar lemon laws. Although my data
do not allow me to establish a causal relationship, they strongly suggest that the
form of the dispute resolution structure, and how business and state actors
construct the meaning of lemon laws through these structures, have critical
implications for the effectiveness of consumer protection laws for consumers.

L

egal scholars, political scientists, and organizational sociologists
are increasingly discussing the rise of governance structures within
private organizations (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Braithwaite
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1982, 2002; Edelman and Suchman 1999; Freeman 1997, 2000;
Freeman and Minow 2009; Lobel 2004; Macaulay 1986). By creating disclosure and ethics policies, reporting systems, and governance boards, organizations’ “private governments” internalize a
significant amount of legal rule-making, interpretation, application, and sanctioning within their own domains (Macaulay 1986).
The rise of organizational governance structures is perhaps best
illustrated by the growing use of internal grievance and alternative
dispute resolution forums to resolve potential legal disputes outside
the court system (Edelman 1990, 1992; Edelman and Suchman
1999; Galanter and Lande 1992; Menkel-Meadow 1999; Sutton
et al. 1994). The increasing privatization of dispute resolution by
organizations has been supported and approved by legislatures and
courts across the United States (Talesh 2009).1 Although it is wellestablished that consumers and other aggrieved parties such as
employees and shareholders are adjudicating public legal rights
through internal grievance and alternative dispute resolution
forums operated by private actors, little empirical research
addresses the process through which the meaning of law is constructed through different organizational dispute resolution structures. In particular, how does the structure of dispute resolution
affect the meaning and implementation of law?
My study addresses this question in the context of state consumer protection laws. During the 1970s and 1980s, in response to
consumer complaints that manufacturers (especially automobile
manufacturers) were failing to stand behind warranties issued to
consumers for products, all fifty states passed consumer warranty
laws (“lemon laws”) that afforded consumers powerful rights and
remedies (Nowicki 1999). However, these rights are now largely
contingent on first using alternative dispute resolution structures,
some created and operated by private organizations and others
by states (Talesh 2009). California and Vermont represent two
extremes in the continuum of how disputes arising under lemon
laws are resolved. California’s lemon law mandates that disputes be
resolved in dispute resolution forums funded by automobile manufacturers but operated by external third-party organizations. By
contrast, in Vermont, consumer disputes are resolved in a public
alternative dispute resolution structure operated by the state alone.
Through in-depth interviews and participant observation in
the training programs dispute resolution arbitrators undergo in
each state, I show how different dispute resolution structures
1
The United States Supreme Court in AT&T v. Concepcion recently reaffirmed its
deference toward privatizing dispute resolution and specifically noted that the “efficient,
streamlined procedures . . . reduc[e] the cost and increase[e] the speed of dispute resolution” (AT&T v. Concepcion 2011:1749).
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operating in California and Vermont give different meanings to
substantially similar lemon laws, one influenced by business values
and the other balancing business and consumer values. Although
my data do not allow me to establish a causal relationship, they
strongly suggest that the form of the dispute resolution structure, in
addition to how business and state actors construct the meaning of
lemon laws through these structures, have critical implications for
the effectiveness of consumer protection laws for consumers.
My analysis draws from, links, and contributes to two literatures
that examine the relationship between organizational governance
structures and law: socio-legal studies of repeat players’ advantages
in disputing and neo-institutional organizational sociology studies
of how managerial and business values influence the way organizations construct law and compliance. Although socio-legal and
neo-institutional scholars have examined the relationship between
organizations, dispute resolution structures, and law, they have not
sufficiently explored the micro-processes and mechanisms through
which the meaning and operation of law is constructed in dispute
resolution structures or the way managerial values flow into these
structures. My study bridges these two literatures by showing how
the structure of dispute resolution shapes the extent to which managerial and business values influence the meaning of law, and consequently, the extent to which repeat players are advantaged.2
My study, therefore, expands upon prior analyses of the relationship between organizational governance structures and law in
several ways. First, although my study fits within the long tradition
of exploring the gap between the law on the books and law in
action (Macaulay 1963), it builds on this tradition by examining
the meaning-making activities of organizations as they adjudicate
public legal rights in third-party forums they create. Whereas previous work emphasizes the gap between the law in action and the
law on the books, my study shows how the law in action in essence
becomes the law on the books. Second, while prior neo-institutional
studies show how business values influence written policies and
internal legal structures (Edelman et al. 1993; Marshall 2005), I
show how business logics also flow into dispute resolution structures run by external third-party organizations. My comparative
research design also uncovers the micro-processes and mechanisms
by which business values can shape the meaning of law and
explores the conditions under which that occurs. Finally, whereas
more recent scholarship advocates deregulation, public-private
partnerships, and organizational self-governance in the context of
the delivery of services and benefits in society, my analysis sounds a
2
For purposes of this study, “structure” refers to the different dispute resolution
processes and systems operating in California and Vermont.
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note of caution. At least in the context of the adjudication of public
legal rights, I show the privatization of dispute resolution by
organizations has the potential to undermine the rights of social
have-nots.

Consumer Warranty Laws—Public Legal Rights
Adjudicated in Private and Public Dispute
Resolution Forums
In an effort to encourage manufacturers, in particular, automobile manufacturers, to make safe products and to stand behind
warranties issued to consumers, all fifty states passed consumer
warranty laws in the 1970s and 1980s, California being the first.3 If
manufacturers were unable to make repairs as promised under
their warranties, consumers could seek relief in court and obtain
full restitution or replacement of their product, attorneys’ fees, and
in some states, a civil penalty up to two times the actual damages. In
most states, consumers could invoke a “legal presumption” against
automobile manufacturers that they had provided manufacturers a
“reasonable number of attempts” as a matter of law if their automobiles were out of service for thirty calendar days or if they gave
manufacturers four repair attempts within the first 12 months or
12,000 miles.4
Over time, consumers’ ability to claim a legal presumption and
obtain powerful legal rights and remedies afforded in court became
largely contingent upon first using internal dispute resolution processes created and funded by automobile manufacturers. As these
structures gained traction among similar organizations and became
institutionalized, automobile manufacturers moved these processes
outside their organizations and contracted with third-party organizations to administer manufacturers’ dispute resolution programs
(Talesh 2009). All fifty states have codified these third-party dispute
resolution processes into law. Unlike courts, these private dispute
resolution forums do not provide attorneys’ fees or civil penalties
and permit arbitrators in certain situations to award extra legal
remedies such as another repair attempt.5
3
In 1970, California passed the first consumer warranty protection law, the SongBeverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly Act) Civil Code § 1790 et seq. (1970).
4
The permissible range for invoking the legal presumption in most states is now the
first 18 months or 18,000 miles from purchase.
5
In particular, if a consumer has a defect with her vehicle but has not met a statutory
requirement such as establishing a reasonable number of attempts, the arbitrator may still
award extra legal remedies such as an additional repair attempt, reimbursement for an
expense, or “other” nominal remedies.
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By contrast, Vermont was the first of thirteen states to also create
and administer a state-run dispute resolution structure where the
only remedies available are full refund or replacement. Consumers
making lemon law claims are allowed to choose between using the
dispute resolution structures manufacturers fund or Vermont’s
Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board (“Lemon Law Board”). Unlike the
single-arbitrator system in the private dispute resolution programs,
the Lemon Law Board consists of a five-person panel of arbitrators
(three citizens, an automotive dealer representative, and a technical
expert) appointed by the governor that hears lemon law cases twice
a month in a government building. There are no attorneys’ fees and
no civil penalties in this forum. Other than appealing for abuse of
discretion, there is no right to sue in court.
Thus, despite affording consumers substantively similar formal
rights and remedies across states, the lemon law field developed
different private and state disputing structures and processes for
resolving consumer disputes outside courts. Moreover, outcome
data on who wins between consumers and manufacturers in these
private and state-run disputing forums in California and Vermont
also diverges. Figure 1 shows that from 1996–2007, consumers
obtained refund or replacement far more often in Vermont than in
California.6
Even when consumers win in California, they do not always win
refund or replacement (the only remedies defined by California’s
statute), but rather, approximately half the time consumers win an
opportunity to allow manufacturers to repair their automobiles, a
reimbursement for a specific expense, or some other remedy. I

Figure 1. California and Vermont Consumer Outcomes.

6
Upon request, Vermont provided me all consumer outcome data from 1996 to 2007
while California provided all data from 1991 to 2007.
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labeled these “extra-legal” remedies in Figure 1 because they are
not one of the statutory remedies provided in the lemon law.
Given there are similar formal laws but different dispute resolution structures and outcomes in California and Vermont, this
study sought to explore the following research question: how does
the structure of dispute resolution affect the meaning and implementation of law? My study does not attempt to make causal claims
regarding different structures’ effects on outcomes. In particular,
my small sample size of two states makes it difficult to determine
whether differences in consumer win rates could be attributed to
characteristics of the dispute resolution structures or were due to
differences in the types of cases, manufacturers settling cases prior
to lemon law hearings, or other factors. Rather, I was primarily
interested in exploring the differences in how these private and
state dispute resolution structures operate and implement law and
seeing what differences might be relevant. In doing so, my study
may help inform future quantitative research that can control for
more variables and further test the possible causal link between
dispute resolution structures and case outcomes.

Law, Organizations, and Dispute Resolution Structures
My theoretical framework for answering my research question
drew from socio-legal studies of repeat player advantages in disputing forums and new-institutional organizational sociology
studies of how managerial values influence the way organizations
respond to law. Each scholarly community emphasizes different
mechanisms for explaining how organizations gain advantage in
organizational governance structures. However, a central question
relevant to both neo-institutional and socio-legal scholars that has
not been sufficiently explored with systematic and persistent observations is how the meaning of law is constructed through different
organizational dispute resolution structures.
In 1974, Marc Galanter argued “repeat player” litigants,
namely, large bureaucratic organizations, shape the development of
law and impede social reform through the legal system by playing
for favorable rules, i.e., settling cases likely to produce adverse
precedent and litigating cases likely to produce rules that promote
their interests. Although Galanter also suggested that repeat
players, through greater access to attorneys, alternative resources,
and documentary evidence, would leverage their position to move
dispute resolution in-house through alternative dispute resolution,
this hypothesis has not received the same level of investigation as
the wide-ranging studies on courts and tribunals (Albiston 1999;
Dotan 1999; Kritzer and Silbey 2003; Lempert 1999; McGuire
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1995; Sandefur 2005; Seron et al. 2001; Songer et al. 1999; Songer
and Sheehan 1992; Szmer et al. 2007; Wheeler et al. 1987). Empirical studies of informal disputing structures using Galanter’s framework focus on variation in complainants’ success rates (Colvin 2011;
Eisenberg and Hill 2003; Bingham and Sarraf 2000; Bingham
1998; Hanningan 1977; Hirsh 2008), the influence of occupational
prestige and experience (Kinsey and Stalans 1999; Hirsh 2008),
lawyer representation (Bingham 1997), legal resources (Bingham
1997; Burstein 1989; Hirsh 2008; Steele 1974) and complaint handlers’ decision making (Gilad 2010). Noting the dearth of empirical
studies on “private courts” (Galanter and Lande 1992: 394), law
and society scholars repeatedly call for more studies of private
dispute resolution structures, where many individuals increasingly
adjudicate public legal rights (Edelman and Suchman 1999; Galanter and Lande 1992; Macaulay 1986).
New institutional organizational sociology studies on the other
hand, examine how managerial values shape the way organizations
respond to law and compliance. These studies show that law
becomes “managerialized” when business values such as rationality,
efficiency, and management discretion operating within an organizational field7 influence the way organizations understand law,
legality, and compliance (Edelman et al. 2001).8 Existing research
shows how managerial and business conceptions of law: (1) broaden
the term “diversity” in a way that disassociates the term from its
original goal of protecting civil rights (Edelman et al. 2001), (2)
transform sexual harassment claims into personality conflicts
(Edelman et al. 1993), (3) deflect or discourage complaints rather
than offer informal resolution (Marshall 2005), and (4) even shape
the way public legal institutions such as legislatures (Talesh 2009)
and courts (Edelman 2005, 2007; Edelman et al. 1999) understand
law and compliance. Training programs administered by intraorganizational professionals such as in-house lawyers and human
resource professionals help institutionalize managerialized conceptions of compliance by often claiming that grievance procedures
and formal personnel offices insulate organizations from legal
liability while simultaneously limiting law’s impact on managerial
power and unfettered discretion (Bisom-Rapp 1996, 1999;
Edelman et al. 1992).
7
The construct of an organizational field refers to the community of organizations and
affiliated entities, including suppliers, customers, competitors, that share common systems
of meaning, values, and norms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott
2002; Scott and Meyer 1991).
8
The primary logic of organizational fields has traditionally been a business or managerial logic that emphasizes managerial discretion and authority as a means of achieving
efficient and effective production or services (Selznick 1969; Orloff and Skocpol 1984;
Jacoby 1985; Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings 1986).
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Although early accounts of organizations, and in particular,
organizational fields, emphasize the way uniformity, taken-forgrantedness, and institutional homogeneity lead to one dominant
logic within a field (Tolbert and Zucker 1983), more recent work
emphasizes that fields often include multiple and contradictory
logics (Edelman et al. 2001; Friedland and Alford 1991; Heimer
1999; Lounsbury et al. 2003; Schneiberg 2002; Schneiberg and
Soule 2004; Scott et al. 2000; Stryker 2000).9 Most recently, interviews with lemon law actors involved in lemon law dispute resolution across the United States reveal that there are underlying
competing business and consumer logics operating among public
(state regulators, state lemon law administrators, state arbitrators)
and private (manufacturers, automotive dealers, third-party administrators, private arbitrators) actors (Talesh 2011).10
In sum, socio-legal and neo-institutional empirical studies
emphasize different mechanisms for explaining how organizational repeat players gain advantage in organizational governance
structures. Socio-legal studies suggest that repeat players maintain
structural advantages in public legal institutions and private organizational forums, but devote little research to how different alternative dispute resolution structures shape the meaning of law and
facilitate or inhibit repeat player advantages. Similarly, existing
neo-institutional research predicts that managers, and in particular, managerialized conceptions of law operating within organizational fields, influence the way in which organizations understand
law and compliance. Less attention, however, is devoted to how
managerial values flow into dispute resolution structures or the
conditions under which this occurs. My study bridges these two
literatures by demonstrating how the institutional design of the
dispute resolution structure influences the degree to which managerial values shape the meaning and implementation of law and
consequently, the degree to which repeat players gain advantage.
As I discuss in the next section, I used two different qualitative
methods, participant observation and interviewing, to answer my
research question.

9
The term “logic” refers to the way individuals organize their thoughts and assumptions about meaning, values, schemas, and culture (Friedland and Alford 1991).
10
Private actors view the purpose of lemon laws and the value of informal disputing
forums as adhering to “business logics” of efficiency, cost-effectiveness, allowing for managerial discretion and control, productivity (solving problems informally) and customer
retention. Conversely, public actors view the goals and purposes of lemon laws and dispute
resolution in a “consumer logic” more closely tied to the liberal legal language of rights,
protection, equal access, transparency, and precedent. In sum, lemon law disputes are
adjudicated in different structures with public and private actors deploying differing value
systems concerning lemon laws and dispute resolution.
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Methodology
Site Selection

Before highlighting my methodology, a brief explanation of
why I chose California and Vermont to study is warranted. My site
selection was driven by two goals. First, I wanted to compare two
states operating dispute resolution systems outside the court
system. Second, I wanted to select two states with significant variation along the dimensions of public and private control of the
dispute resolution structures. Figure 2 highlights the various lemon
law dispute resolution structures in the United States.
While all fifty states allow third-party administrators to operate
lemon law programs on behalf of manufacturers, I chose California
because there are more lemon law cases in California than in any
other state. Because there is an active docket of lemon law cases,
third-party administrators conduct more arbitrator training
processes in California than in any other state and consequently
provided me more opportunity to collect data. Of the thirteen
state-run dispute resolution programs, I eliminated the two states
using administrative law judges because I wanted to avoid a court
versus alternative dispute resolution comparison. I also eliminated
the four states that contract directly with a private organization
because these structures reflect a mixture of public and private
control. Of the remaining seven states using arbitration panels, I
chose Vermont because its dispute resolution program was the most
clearly publicly run (while the others had elements of the private
structure in the early stages) and Vermont’s program coordinator
expressed the most willingness to grant access and be studied.
Participant Observation: Training Processes for California and
Vermont’s Dispute Resolution Arbitrators

Two of the three third-party administrator organizations
operating dispute resolution programs on behalf of automobile

Figure 2. Case Site Selection.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2189028

472

How Dispute Resolution System Design Matters

manufacturers in California granted me access to observe and participate in their arbitrator training programs. Both third-party
administrator organizations that I studied were national organizations that specialize in dispute resolution (mediation and arbitration) of a variety of disputes often involving consumers and
businesses. One organization, which I refer to as National Dispute
Resolution (NDR), only recruits lawyers to be lemon law arbitrators. The other organization, the Bureau of Dispute Resolution
(BDR), recruits primarily non-lawyers (though lawyers are permitted to join).11 Both California training programs use non-lawyers to
train arbitrators. Each training program consists of two-to-three
day training sessions run by the respective organization. Training
processes in California typically occur two times a year. I attended
and participated in two NDR training sessions and two BDR training sessions over the course of 18 months.
My primary goal was to understand how arbitrators are socialized into the field and taught what the lemon law means. In doing
so, I evaluated how trainers were amplifying or suppressing business or consumer logics. Attending training programs allowed me
evaluate the extent to which training programs employ formal legal
formulas for determining breach of warranty and what if any extralegal criteria trainers use to teach what constitutes a breach of
warranty. These venues gave me access to the processes through
which law is constructed and implemented by third-party administrator organizations.12
During my research, I was surprised to learn that unlike California, Vermont does not conduct a formal training program but
instead trains new arbitrators on an individual basis. Accordingly,
my evaluation of their training program consisted of in-depth
interviews with the state program administrator in charge of training, Vermont’s legal counsel, and asking all arbitrators I interviewed to explain the training they received. Despite Vermont’s
lack of a formal training program, I am relatively confident that I
captured how Vermont trains its arbitrators because the program
administrator and legal counsel spoke in detail about their role in
training, the goals and points of emphasis in the training program,
and the rationale for having a panel of arbitrators adjudicate cases
in a public forum.

11
As a condition of being granted access, both organizations requested I use pseudonym names in any scholarship produced from my research. Thus, I have replaced the
actual names of each organization with the pseudonyms “NDR” and “BDR.”
12
Although I was not permitted to tape record any part of the training programs I
attended, I took notes during the sessions and drafted my fieldnotes shortly thereafter
(Emerson et al. 1995).
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Table 1. In-Depth and Ethnographic Interviews
# of Interviews
Interview Category

Type of Actors Interviewed

Automobile Manufacturers

Corporate Executives in charge
of Lemon Law Issues
Third-Party Administrators
Head of Arbitration Training Dept.
(2 different organizations) Trainers/Instructors
Corporate Executives
Corporate Liaison to Manufacturers
CA Private Arbitrators
Private Arbitrators hired by
Third-Party Administrators
CA State Regulators
Director of Regulatory Dept.
Lemon Law Certification
& Monitoring Regulators
VT State Administrators
Program Administrator
Lemon Law legal counsel
Legislative Analyst
VT Panel Arbitrators
Automotive Dealers
Technical Experts
Citizen Arbitrators
Total

In-Depth

Ethnographic

6

5

8

1

0

11

4

4

3

1

13

3

34

25

In-Depth and Ethnographic Interviews

I conducted fifty-nine in-depth and ethnographic interviews
with five categories of participants: (1) automobile manufacturers;
(2) two separate third-party administrator organizations; (3) California state regulators; (4) Vermont state administrators; and (5)
Vermont arbitrators (see Table 1).13 I identified interviewees
through a combination of purposive, niche, and snowball sampling
(Lofland 1995).14
I asked all interviewees to offer their perspective on the
purpose of warranties and lemon laws. I asked actors to characterize the objectives of lemon law dispute resolution structures and
their role in such structures, as well as the goals of training programs. By asking substantially similar questions to all actors in the
field, public and private, I was able to chart the areas of consensus
and contestation. All in-depth interviews were confidential, lasted
sixty to ninety minutes, and were digitally recorded and transcribed with the consent of the research subjects. I used qualitative
coding software, ATLAS.ti, to code my interview and ethnographic
13
Ethnographic interviewing is a type of qualitative research that combines immersive
observation and directed one-on-one interviews (Spradley 1979).
14
With respect to Vermont’s dispute resolution structure, the program administrator
provided me with the contact information for seventeen current or retired arbitrators.
Thirteen arbitrators agreed to be interviewed. Because arbitrators serve a three-year term
on the Lemon Law Board with the opportunity for renewal two times, my data reflects
arbitrator perspectives over a period of twenty years. No interviews of regulators were
conducted in Vermont because they do not have any. In fact, other than California, few
states have a regulatory department dedicated to monitoring manufacturers’ dispute resolution programs.
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data. This allowed an additional layer of transparency, systematization, and formality to my coding process.

How Different Organizational Dispute Resolution
Structures Shape the Meaning of Law
This section demonstrates how different dispute resolution
structures operating in California and Vermont filter competing
business and consumer logics in different ways. This results in
different organizational structures giving different meanings to
substantially similar lemon laws operating in both states, one influenced by business values and the other balancing business and
consumer values.
In California, managerial and business values of efficiency,
managerial discretion and control, productivity and customer
retention flow into the rules, procedures, and meaning of law
operating in dispute resolution structures mainly through a training and socialization process for California arbitrators. Third-party
administrators hired by automobile manufacturers to run their
dispute resolution programs teach a set of rationales and scripts
that emphasize eliminating consumer emotion and individual voice
from the process and narrowing the fact-finding role of arbitrators.
Arbitrator training programs reshape the meaning of law by building discretion and flexibility into legal procedure and remedies
and recontextualizing legal rules and arbitrator decision making
around a set of business values. As a result, arbitrators are taught to
deploy an altered version of the lemon law that mirrors formal law,
but is filtered with business values and influence. Moreover, organizational repeat players gain subtle advantages through the operation of the dispute resolution structure.
In contrast to California’s managerial justice adjudicatory
model, Vermont uses a collaborative justice model that balances
various interested stakeholders, reflecting both business and consumer values in a state funded and designed dispute resolution
structure. As a result, Vermont’s structure is far less likely to
emphasize business values at the expense of consumer interests and
prevents many repeat player advantages enjoyed by manufacturers
in California. To the extent business values are introduced into the
process by the presence of an automotive dealer and technical
expert board members, they are balanced with competing consumer values by the presence of three citizen arbitrators on the
Lemon Law Board and a program administrator who oversees the
program. In particular, citizen arbitrators balance the fact-finding
and deliberation process with a consumer perspective that
often allows emotion and individual voice to enter the process.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2189028
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Furthermore, the technical expert on the Lemon Law Board counterbalances manufacturers’ repeat player advantages, e.g., greater
knowledge, experience, and ability to offer expert testimony or
expert reports.
The following analysis highlights how different structures influence the meaning and implementation of law in different ways. I
focus on five important structural differences that emerge from
having one organizational structure dominated by business values
and the other balanced with consumer and business values: (1) the
adjudicative orientation of dispute resolution arbitrators; (2) the
fact-finding role of dispute resolution arbitrators; (3) the role of
consumer emotion and individual voice in the process; (4) the level
of enforcement of legal procedures; and (5) the meaning of legal
terms and remedies.
Adjudicative Orientation of Dispute Resolution Arbitrators

Consistent with prior neo-institutional studies (cf. Bisom-Rapp
1996, 1999; Edelman, Abraham, and Erlanger 1992), professional
training is a key mechanism for the diffusion of organizational
constructions of law in manufacturer-sponsored training programs.
The dispute resolution programs in California and Vermont train
and socialize their arbitrators in different ways. In California,
arbitrators are taught to disregard any prior knowledge of legal
processes and strictly follow what they are taught in the training
processes. Trainers emphasize discretion and flexibility with respect
to applying formal law in these processes. This philosophical orientation is a key mechanism for explaining how organizations
shape the meaning of law.
Conversely, Vermont’s panel of arbitrators receive minimal
formal training and socialization. The little training they do receive
largely focuses on assuring that they apply formal law. Vermont
arbitrators believe the effectiveness of the Lemon Law Board is
contingent on the right mixture of people offering different consumer and business perspectives while still operating within the
strictures of formal law. The legitimacy of California’s dispute resolution training programs administered by the NDR and BDR is
based on the idea that professional training and socialization
produce impartial and neutral decision makers. In Vermont, these
same core legal principles rest on interest representation and balancing consumer and business logics in the structure.
Almost immediately after California’s dispute resolution training programs begin, arbitrators, the majority of whom are lawyers,
are socialized to approach legal decision making from the NDR and
BDR’s perspectives and follow the script provided to them. After
warning arbitrators that their forum has a different philosophy
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2189028
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than the court system, trainers that I interviewed indicate that they
instruct arbitrators to follow organizational prerogatives when
adjudicating lemon law disputes and writing legal decisions:
THIRD-PARTY ADM.: I’m like you’re going to write this, you’re
going to say this, you’re going to do this because this is our
program. It’s got all kinds of rules and intricacies. . . . Just because
you’re a lawyer, just because you’ve had X education, just because
you’ve had lots of experience arbitrating doesn’t mean anything
to me in terms of what I need you to do and how you need to
operate in this program. (Third-party Adm., BC8020, lines
374–387)

By deploying a program philosophy that asks arbitrators to not
think like lawyers and simply follow what they are taught, California training programs create discretionary space for considering
non-legal values when evaluating consumer disputes. For example,
although trainers repeatedly stress the importance of due process,
business values of maintaining managerial discretion and flexibility
influence the degree to which formal law is applied (cf. Edelman
1992). In order to allow increased adjudicatory discretion in these
processes, formal law is expressly devalued in California training
programs:
THIRD PARTY ADM.: Because so and so versus so and so [referring to a case], what does that really have to do with exactly what
I’m looking at today, you know? Because an arbitrator, I think
they feel like they’re judge for the day. And if they feel it rises to
the level of substantial impairment [of use, value, or safety], it’s
going to rise to the level of substantial impairment whether it’s
wind, noise or electrical issues. So I think arbitrators enjoy the
program because they feel like they have flexibility too. (Thirdparty Adm. lines 1100–1128)
THIRD-PARTY ADM.: The fact that we include [cases] in California has actually always been a source of agitation for me. It’s
starting to shove legal things into a process that really was
intended not to be a legal process completely.
[Legal] decisions can be made and they can be wrong. And this
piece of case law can contradict that piece of case law. I don’t see
it as having a place in the arbitration. (Third-party Adm.,
BC8050, lines 665–734)

California training programs also provide a written training
manual that limits the legal principles and reasoning arbitrators are
permitted to use when evaluating lemon law cases. Other than what
is taught during training sessions and conveyed in the written
manual (which includes some statutes and cases while excluding
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others), trainers forbid arbitrators from conducting additional legal
research. This framework signals to arbitrators that all they need to
know about lemon laws is confined to the training manual and
two-day training course. However, filtering selected legal provisions into a manual creates discretionary space for California training programs to re-contextualize certain legal principles around a
set of business values (cf. Mertz 2007). In particular, the training
manuals include the NDR and BDR’s written interpretations of the
meaning of some cases and statutes. By controlling the oral and
written educational process, the NDR and BDR are able to influence how arbitrators understand lemon laws.
The training curriculum in Vermont is strikingly different from
California both in style and substance. First, there is very little
formal training of arbitrators on the Vermont Lemon Law Board
and no formal training program. Because arbitrators serve threeyear terms that can be renewed twice, training occurs on a rolling
basis as new members are appointed to the Lemon Law Board by
the governor of Vermont. Second, the goals of Vermont’s training
curriculum reflect more of an orientation toward rights, protection,
and following formal law than California’s curriculum. Instead of
relaxing the degree to which formal law is applied, Vermont’s brief
training curriculum emphasizes adherence to formal law, patience,
and thoroughness when deciding cases:
INTERVIEWER: When you’re training a new board member,
what values are you hoping to instill in the board members? What
are you trying to accomplish?
STATE ADM.: Consistency with application of the law. And they
do this, [the panel arbitrators are] very thoughtful in reference to
not rushing, like they take it seriously. They’re not in a hurry to
leave. (State Adm., DC4500, lines 700–720)

Third, instead of including only selected provisions of the lemon
law, Vermont arbitrators are asked to review a complete copy of the
lemon law statute. Unlike California training programs, Vermont’s
program administrator does not offer any specific interpretation or
guidance regarding what specific statutory provisions mean.
Receiving a copy of the actual statute as opposed to an edited
version in a manual reduces the opportunities to filter business
values into what lemon laws mean.
Perhaps most importantly, the legitimacy of Vermont’s Lemon
Law Board emerges from panel balance and adjudicating cases in a
transparent forum. Vermont’s arbitrators believe it is critical to
have business and consumer perspectives present in the decision
making process because statutory terms such as “substantial
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impairment of use, value, or safety” and “reasonable number of
attempts” are ambiguous with respect to their meaning (cf.
Edelman 1990, 1992):
PANEL ARBITRATOR (TECHNICAL EXPERT): But that is
where I think having different people on the board, because what
may not be substantial [impairment] to me, may be very substantial to a consumer advocate. And I may lose. That is why it is good
to have a representation. [T]hat is what I like about the board, it
is diverse. . . .
We have an older gentlemen [citizen board member] sometimes
when he asks a question, I’m like, “Where in the heck is he going
with this thing,” because we think differently. He was a legislator for
years. So he asks a question and all of a sudden he enlightens me.
(Technical Expert Panel Arbitrator, LL4530, lines 590–617, 1035–
1043) (emphasis added)

As opposed to forcing arbitrators to conform to one interpretation
of lemon laws, Vermont reconciles the inherent ambiguity of law by
assuring that business and consumer perspectives are part of the
legal decision making process.
Thus, the different adjudicative orientations in California and
Vermont facilitate and inhibit the conditions under which and the
degree to which business values are more or less likely to flow into
law. In California, arbitrators are immediately socialized to deemphasize formal law. This philosophical orientation creates space for
non-legal values to pour into the meaning of law. In Vermont,
arbitrators are part of a structure that relies on balancing the
Lemon Law Board with multiple stakeholder perspectives and
applying formal law unfiltered by an extensive training curriculum.
The Fact-Finding Role of Dispute Resolution Arbitrators

While both Vermont and California dispute resolution programs emphasize impartiality and neutrality, they construe the
meaning of these terms differently. The divergent fact-finding
approaches arbitrators deploy in both states illustrate the way
impartiality and neutrality mean different things. In California,
impartiality and neutrality are considered compromised when arbitrators actively investigate facts. In Vermont, actively investigating
facts is considered a necessary component for establishing impartiality and neutrality. This distinction is important because passive
arbitrators in California provide structural advantages for repeat
players whereas the inquisitorial role of arbitrators in Vermont
offsets repeat player advantages.
For example, California training programs teach arbitrators to
act as passive arbiters and rely solely on parties’ production of
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relevant factual evidence. Trainers that I interviewed indicate that
they warn arbitrators that actively investigating facts compromises
their neutrality and impartiality: “It is up to the parties to prove
their own cases and we do not want an arbitrator stepping over the
line of proving a case for a party . . . I wouldn’t [say], how does that
[car defect] effect your use [of the vehicle] because then you are
feeding them, you are leading their evidence” (Third-party Adm.,
BC8000 lines 528–531, 555–566). In contrast, Vermont arbitrators
view their role as inquisitorial. Vermont arbitrators indicate it
is their responsibility to actively gather information and facts
regardless of whether the parties offer information on their own.
According to Vermont arbitrators, active investigation assures a
procedurally fair and neutral process:
INTERVIEWER: Did you feel like [asking many questions] was
compromising your neutrality?
PANEL ARBITRATOR (CITIZEN): No. I think we had an obligation to do that. . . . It wasn’t our job to try the case, but by the
same token, it was our responsibility to get all the facts so we
could make a decision. (Citizen Panel Arbitrators, LL4540, lines
628–636)

Thus, active fact-finding preserves arbitrator impartiality and neutrality in Vermont whereas active investigation compromises the
process in California.
Active investigation also counterbalances any experiential and
informational advantage manufacturers maintain such as manufacturers’ unilateral access to repair history records and ability to
bring experts or expert reports into evidence:
PANEL ARBITRATOR (CITIZEN): Sometimes the consumer
really didn’t know how to present his or her case very well. And by
the same token, the manufacturer probably had been in there two
or three times and had some experience.
So it behooved the board to lead the consumer to ask questions
that the consumer was not aware of. Because the consumer
wouldn’t know—sometimes the consumer’s not very well educated and wouldn’t know what substantial impairment of use,
value or safety meant. So we would have to say, well, do you think
this substantially impairs the car and all that. So we’d have to lead
the consumer in that direction, to be fair. (Citizen Panel Arbitrators, LL4540, lines 600–628)

Actively investigating facts in Vermont also includes preventing
intimidation from repeat players against one-shotters during
questioning:
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PANEL ARBITRATOR (TECHNICAL EXPERT): So I had to
step in because [the manufacturer] basically was trying to sway the
board, [] on a technicality or whatever his point was, I would play
a devil’s advocate and give the consumer the chance to do the
same thing, and [the manufacturer] got mad at me and called me
out on it. And I said to him, “I am not going to allow you to be a
bully at this board. It is as simple as that. If you think that
something plays well for your client, we are going to go quid
pro quo.” (Technical Expert Panel Arbitrators, LL4530, lines
1096–1143)

The inquisitorial role of Vermont arbitrators, therefore, appears
to curb repeat player advantages manufacturers may gain with
passive arbiters in California.
Business logics that permeate training processes in California
also affect the amount of independent expert information offered
into evidence concerning automobile defects. For example, California training programs teach arbitrators that they may appoint a
technical expert to examine a vehicle and issue an expert report if
necessary. However, by focusing on efficiency, time delay, and
resource conservation, trainers dissuade arbitrators from using
technical experts:
THIRD-PARTY ADM.: It is a long process [to hire a technical
expert] and you should not waste the time and delay unless it is necessary. . . . Think about the relevance. Think about why you need
it. They are not the end all be all. (IR7010, FN, lines 232–248)

By framing technical experts as potentially unnecessary or an inefficient use of time, California training programs exclude neutral
technical experts who may have the requisite experience and
mechanical equipment to identify vehicle problems and leave evaluation to the lay knowledge of arbitrators, who usually have only
manufacturer testimony to rely on. In fact, manufacturers I interviewed indicate that they often bring mechanical experts to hearings.15 Under these circumstances, arbitrators are especially captive
to manufacturers’ technical evaluations and testimony because they
are trained to avoid appointing independent experts. In this way,
the dispute resolution structure subtly gives repeat players control
over the degree and scope of technical information admitted into the
hearing. Indeed, California state regulators repeatedly lamented in
interviews how efficiency concerns guide the way facts are offered
into evidence and hinder the overall fairness of the third-party
administrators’ dispute resolution programs.
15
State regulators who audit California lemon law hearings also indicate consumers
rarely if ever bring a technical expert to hearings.
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In Vermont, arbitrators indicate having a technical expert on the
Lemon Law Board prevents parties from misleading the Board
regarding technical defects or problems with vehicles, combats information asymmetry between manufacturers and consumers, and
leads to better evaluation of the technical issues involved in the case:
PANEL ARBITRATOR (CITIZEN): Well I know on our board,
we have had cases [where] the manufacturer has said something
and the technician would say no, I don’t believe that’s quite right.
Then they would discuss it and come to find out, the technician
would be right.
And the manufacturer, I don’t think he was trying to mislead, but
I think he was presenting it in a different light than the technician
would view it. And I think the technician is there to keep the
manufacturer honest for one thing. And I don’t mean to say that
he would be dishonest. But just to keep all the facts straight.
And on our board, I definitely am glad a technician is there.
Because if the manufacturer makes a statement, you can always
look at the technician and say is that right. And he’ll usually say
yes, that’s right. (Citizen Panel Arbitrator, LL4570, lines 714–745)

Thus, the rules and procedures California arbitrators are taught to
follow when fact-finding are subtly tilted toward manufacturers’
interpretations and evidence. Although neutral on their face,
trainer concerns over maintaining impartiality and a fast, efficient
process when discovering facts allow manufacturers structural
advantages (cf. Galanter 1974). Conversely, Vermont arbitrators
view active fact-finding as a duty, a mechanism for impeaching the
credibility of parties, and a technique for preventing either party
from gaining advantages simply because they possess more documents, expertise, or experience.
The Role of Consumer Emotion and Individual Voice in the Process

Public and private actors in Vermont and California both claim
their forum creates an informal, flexible adjudicatory environment
that still provides due process protections such as the right to an
impartial and neutral decision maker, the right to notice and
opportunity to be heard, and the right to present and rebut evidence. However, they conceptualize the meaning of due process
protections differently.
In California training programs, due process concerns require
removing consumer emotion and individual voice from all facets of
the adjudicatory process. While informal disputing forums are traditionally thought of as domains that value emotion and individual
voice (Bush 1989; Bush and Folger 1994), trainers in California
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admonish arbitrators “don’t feel buyer’s remorse” and “have
empathy not sympathy.” Concerns that matter to consumers, especially the emotional impact of the problem, are constructed as
irrelevant. Thus, emotion in these processes is omitted from the
entire process, regardless of whether such emotions were germane
to determining whether a consumer met her burden of establishing
a “safety defect” or “substantial impairment of use, value, or safety
of the vehicle to the buyer.”
Unlike California, Vermont arbitrators emphasize the importance of emotion and consumer voice when evaluating consumer
grievances:
PANEL ARBITRATOR (DEALER): Sometimes some emotion is a
good thing. . . . [W]hen consumers are emotional, you see them
telling their case. We are here for a hearing for about an hour. We
are here for a snapshot of their experience with the car. So when
you see emotions, you can sometimes get a quick snapshot and a
good feel of their experience and that is really important. (Dealer
Panel Arbitrator, LL4590, lines 120–125)

Emotion, therefore, offers an important lens into the consumer’s
experience with her vehicle.
Consumer emotion is also weighed heavily in Lemon Law
Board deliberations. Vermont arbitrators indicate citizen panel
arbitrator perceptions of mechanical problems as anxiety provoking and an emotional experience were important issues to consider,
especially when evaluating whether a defect “substantially impaired
the use, value or safety of the vehicle to the buyer”:
PANEL ARBITRATOR (TECHNICAL EXPERT): So if we just
had technical people on the board that were all car people, it is
not a good representation of what a consumer goes through.
Let’s say you have a consumer advocate on the board who is a
female that has raised children, and the consumer that comes
[to the hearing] is primarily a female, and three times her kids
were locked in the car at the grocery store because the [car]
automatically locked the doors on her. . . . she may look at it and
say, you know what, the livelihoods of those kids are jeopardized, she doesn’t want to leave her kids, because you are not
supposed to leave our kids in the car, somebody might take
them or they might get injured, you just don’t- and that is
where having somebody that is not in the automobile business,
those are the types of questions make me think, “Yeah, I’ve
never thought of it that way,” because I am just thinking technical. I am thinking I know what the car business end of it is
like, and it is good to hear what consumers think and how they
can relate to the inconvenience factor. (Technical Expert Panel
Arbitrator, LL4530, lines 635–710)
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In sum, while both California and Vermont dispute resolution
programs emphasize due process protections, they conceptualize
the meaning of due process differently. California arbitrators are
taught to view consumer emotion and voice as compromising due
process while Vermont arbitrators view consumer emotion—both at
actual hearings and during deliberations—as relevant and fundamental to evaluating the merits of the case and assuring a fair
process.

The Enforcement of Legal Procedures

Business and consumer values are filtered into the procedures
used in dispute resolution structures operating in both states in
very different ways. Specifically, concerns over efficiency and managerial discretion and control drive the tolerant and relaxed procedural rules operating in California. As a result, manufacturers gain
subtle structural advantages even though these procedural rules
are facially neutral. Conversely, in Vermont, concerns over transparency, equal access, and consumer protection drive a series of
strict procedures implemented by the program administrator overseeing the program. Vermont’s structure, therefore, may be more
likely to curtail certain repeat player advantages.
While California training programs, run by the NDR and BDR,
maintain that they are autonomous organizations uninfluenced by
manufacturers and subject to state regulatory oversight, interviews
suggest how manufacturers still influence their programs:
THIRD PARTY ADM. (trainer): Manufacturers are too involved
in the process, you know, that’s a hard one to defend sometimes,
quite honestly. From my perspective, it is actually difficult to
defend. Because I think there are times when I think we do things
that we don’t really need to do. . . . [T]o the extent that whatever
[the Manufacturer Liaison for the BDR] said, you know, we need
to do it this way, it usually wound up we’re going to do it that way
because that’s what the manufacturers want. (Third-party Adm.,
BC8030, lines 564–569, 685–694)

Manufacturer influence is especially evident in the procedures California arbitrators are asked to implement. For example, the NDR
advises arbitrators to allow only twenty minutes for parties to
present their case-in-chief and five minutes for closing arguments.
These guidelines resulted from a few manufacturers complaining
that some consumers were taking too long to present their cases. In
this instance, managerial concerns over having an efficient, quick
process trump allowing parties to present their case in the manner
that suits their strategic interests.
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In order to provide parties as much discretion as possible when
presenting their cases, California dispute resolution structures are
very flexible about what types of evidence are admissible. Although
permitting hearsay and not using formal rules of evidence are
seemingly harmless and in theory make it easier for consumers to
offer evidence (NDR Part I, lines 140–144; ZZ6040, BDR FN, lines
443–445), repeat players benefit from relaxed evidentiary rules
because they have more access to resources, information, warranty
records, and invoices (cf. Galanter 1974). Moreover, in this
instance, repeat player advantages are even greater because, as I
explained in the prior section, arbitrators are instructed to not
actively investigate facts and rely solely on the parties’ presentation
of evidence. The education and socialization process, therefore,
allows legal procedures to be reconstituted and infused with seemingly innocuous business logics of efficiency, informality, discretion,
and control. As a result, organizational repeat players are more
likely to gain subtle advantages.
In contrast to manufacturer-sponsored programs in California,
Vermont arbitrators believe the Lemon Law Board is a legitimate
forum because it is funded and run by the government. Concerns
over equal treatment before the law and transparency are particularly important for establishing legitimacy and preventing excessive
business discretion and influence in the process:
PANEL ARBITRATOR (CITIZEN): Any time the manufacturer is
supporting a program, I would look at it twice because the manufacturer and the dealer do not like intervention on their business.
They don’t like to be told they have to fix a car. . . .
When the legislature that is a freeman’s body makes a decision to
add a program like this, you can rest assured that everybody’s
treated on an equal basis, and that there’s no money coming from
anybody to support the program where there would be a chance
of influence. . . . I think that a government-run [program] like
Vermont is free, it’s equal, and people are all treated fairly. . . .
(Citizen Panel Arbitrator, LL4560, lines 495–528)

Vermont’s dispute resolution structure adheres to a strict procedural format in part to combat excessive arbitrator discretion and
manufacturer informational advantage. Vermont’s structure is different from California’s structures in three important ways. Unlike
California, hearsay evidence is not allowed. Second, parties are not
given any time restriction when presenting their cases. Finally, the
program administrator of the Lemon Law Board actively assures
procedural rules are strictly enforced. As part of her duties, the
administrator makes sure arbitrators prevent parties from making
arguments that were not made in their written statements, prevents
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admission of documents that are not filed at least five days in
advance of the hearing, may request arbitrators ask a question
when discrepancies require clarification, and may personally
interject a clarification question during proceedings. Thus, rather
than build discretion into legal rules, Vermont uses strict procedures and active oversight by the program administrator to add an
additional layer of procedural and substantive protection to the
adjudicatory process.16
The Meaning of Legal Terms and Remedies

Managerialized and business conceptions of law in California
arbitrator training programs also alter the meaning of remedies and
statutory legal terms. Although arbitrators are required to apply
the formal lemon law on the books, arbitrators, in action, apply an
altered form of lemon law (cf. Harrington 1985).
For example, the meaning of legal remedies is reshaped in
California training programs. According to the California lemon
law, a consumer is entitled to full restitution or replacement of her
vehicle if she establishes she met the statutory “legal presumption”
for providing a manufacturer a “reasonable number of attempts” to
fix the automobile. California trainers, however, allow arbitrators
the discretion to determine the appropriate remedy for a consumer
should she prevail:
INTERVIEWER: So in that situation even if the consumer may
have hit the legal presumption, if there’s a sure fix, the arbitrator
has—
THIRD-PARTY ADM.: Can still do it. Mm-hmm. He could still
award another repair. . . . And I think there’s a little bit more
fairness in that, you know, because really, what if you really were
just out with a fix? And that happens all the time. (Third-party
Adm., BC8040, lines 1154–1167)

Thus, even though consumers in California dispute resolution
structures are entitled as a matter of law to the choice of full
restitution or replacement when they establish the “legal presumption,” California training programs build discretion into the
meaning of legal remedies even when formal law does not provide
such discretion. Business values, namely, managerial discretion and
16
Although California state regulators regularly monitor third-party administrator
training programs, they repeatedly lamented their lack of enforcement powers. On one
hand, state regulators encourage manufacturers to voluntarily certify their dispute resolution programs. But on the other hand, California regulators have very little regulatory
teeth to force manufacturers to alter the design and operation of private programs.
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customer retention (by keeping the consumer in her current
vehicle with a repair) trump social context, emotion, and frustration that often drive a consumer who has given a manufacturer six
chances to fix a defect and wants a full refund regardless of whether
the defect can be repaired.
Moreover, interviews I conducted with manufacturers, state
regulators, and 8 years of consumer satisfaction surveys by the
California Department of Consumer Affairs all show that consumers, manufacturers, and state regulators agree that another repair
attempt, reimbursement for expense, or other nominal award
(i.e., extra-legal remedies) do not constitute a consumer “win”
even though a consumer technically receives a decision indicating
she prevailed (Calif. Dept Con. Aff. Survey 2002–09). Thus, even
when manufacturers lose a case and are ordered to award a
repair, all parties believe manufacturers actually prevailed. Based
on the California Department of Consumer Affairs survey data
and my interviews with field actors, the parties themselves seem
to believe extra-legal awards are “symbolic” awards (Edelman
1992).
To provide a richer portrait of how this interpretation of remedies relates to outcomes, Figure 3 shows that, when extra-legal
(symbolic) awards are added to California consumer denials, the
disparity between consumer wins and losses in California is even
larger. Moreover, when compared to Vermont’s win rate over time,
consumers are more likely or at least as likely to lose in California
as they are to win in Vermont.
As noted earlier, to establish a causal link between the dispute
resolution structures and case outcomes would require a sample of
more than two states and data that allow controls for differences in
the types of cases and a variety of broader environmental, cultural,

Figure 3. The Paradox of Winning Through Losing for Manufacturers.
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or ideological factors that might explain the differences in case
outcomes. While the data I collected reveals that it is unlikely that the
variation in the number of cases filed is being driven by environmental factors such as lawyers, business and legal culture, or changes
in the law,17 I was denied data to determine whether the types of
cases in each state are different.18 Nonetheless, differences between
the states in consumer win rates suggest that dispute resolution
structures might be important mechanisms through which one party
or the other gains advantage. At a minimum, the content and
meaning of critical statutory terms that determine whether consumers have a viable cause of action such as “reasonable number of
attempts,” “substantial impairment,” and “legal presumption” are
being determined by semi-autonomous third-party organizations
hired by automobile manufacturers, the very group that such laws
are designed to regulate (Edelman et al. 2011; Edelman and Talesh
2011; Talesh 2009; Edelman et al. 1999).
Conversely, because Vermont arbitrators undergo minimal
formal training, are provided the lemon law statute unfiltered and
without business interpretation, and sit on a panel that balances
business and consumer logics in the adjudicatory structure, business logics do not shape the meaning of law as strongly as in
California. Although automotive dealers I interviewed in Vermont
share the same business values as California automotive dealers and
automobile manufacturers across the country, i.e., efficiency, discretion, control, productivity, and customer retention, business
actors’ perspectives when deciding lemon law cases are counterbal-

17
Both states also provided data on the number of consumer cases filed, dismissed on
administrative grounds, withdrawn, settled before hearing, and ultimately adjudicated at
the hearing. With these data, I considered selection bias effects that could skew my findings
if one state had a disproportionate number of cases falling out prior to hearing. The profiles
in the two states were nearly identical: pre-hearing settlements were reached in 28% of
Vermont cases and 30% of California cases. Moreover, the annual rate of cases filed in both
states was uniform across the entire time frame. Two-thirds of the cases filed for each year
across the time period in my sample are within one standard deviation of the average
number of cases filed in any given year. All of the remaining cases fall within two standard
deviations.
18
In an effort to determine whether the case populations in each state were different,
I requested from both California and Vermont’s dispute resolution programs access to
written complaints filed by consumers for the past ten years to evaluate what specific type
of claims were being made (and thus, develop a measure for types of cases). I also requested
data on which cases ultimately settled prior to a formal ruling. Both dispute resolution
programs denied my request due to the undue burden of compiling this data and confidentiality concerns (mostly pertaining to settlements). Thus, I am unable to definitively rule
out that the cases in each state are different. However, based on my own observation of
actual lemon law hearings in both states, I have no reason to believe the types of cases in
either state are qualitatively different. Moreover, both public and private actors indicated in
interviews that only the “hard” cases reach an actual arbitration hearing. Evaluating
possible qualitative differences among different case populations is always an issue in
comparative studies and exceedingly difficult to obtain and evaluate as a practical matter.
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Table 2. Differences in California and Vermont Dispute Resolution
Structures
California
Managerial Justice
Adjudicatory Model

Vermont
Collaborative Justice
Adjudicatory Model

Education & Training
Program
Socialization Process of
Arbitrators

Extensive

Minimal

Extensive (conformity, follow
organizational script)

Presence of Emotion/Voice in
Adjudicatory Process

Ignored and de-valued

Fact-finding role of
Arbitrators
Procedural Rules

Adversarial Process/Passive
Investigator
Tolerant (e.g., hearsay
permitted)
Based on Professional
Training, Education, &
Socialization

Minimal (maintain and value
identity as a dealer,
technical expert and citizen
arbitrator panel member)
Important, provides snapshot
of consumer’s experience
with vehicle
Inquisitorial Process/Active
Investigator
Strict (e.g., hearsay not
permitted)
Based on Transparency
and Interest
Representation/Balance

Neutrality & Legitimacy

anced with consumer perspectives on the five-person Lemon Law
Board. Thus, both business and consumer interpretations of lemon
law terms are a part of the decision making process.
In sum, the institutional design of dispute resolution, and how
field logics are translated by field actors in different dispute resolution systems, leads to two different meanings of law operating in
California and Vermont (see Table 2).
Consistent with neo-institutional studies of how managerial
conceptions seep into law through training processes (cf. BisomRapp 1996, 1999; Edelman et al. 1992), managerial and business
values flow into law operating in California’s private dispute resolution structures primarily through an arbitration training and
socialization process conducted by third-party administrators. The
institutional context socializes arbitrators to ignore consumer
emotion and narrows the fact-finding role of arbitrators to a
passive arbiter reliant on parties to present facts. As a result, arbitrators are taught to adjudicate cases not in the shadow of the
formal lemon law on the books, but in the shadow of a managerialized lemon law replete with its own rules, procedures, and
construction of law that changes the meaning of consumer protection. Moreover, as business values flow through the disputing
structure, organizational repeat players gain subtle opportunities
for advantages through the operation of California dispute resolution structures.
Vermont’s vastly different dispute resolution system has far
less tendency than the process in California to introduce business
values into the meaning and operation of lemon laws. To the
extent business logics are introduced into the process by the presElectronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2189028
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ence of dealer and technical expert board members, they are balanced with competing consumer logics by the presence of citizen
panel members and a state administrator. Rather than emphasizing professional training and socialization, Vermont’s structure
illustrates how participatory representation, an inquisitorial factfinding approach, and balancing consumer and business perspectives in the decision making process can help curb repeat player
advantages.

The Implications of Organizational Governance Structures
For Consumer Rights
Theoretical and Social Policy Implications

This article elaborates the literature on the relationship between
organizations and law by integrating neo-institutional studies of how
managerial values flow into law with socio-legal studies of repeat
players’ advantages in disputing. In the lemon law context, the
structure of dispute resolution shapes the extent to which managerial and business values influence the meaning of law, and consequently, the extent to which repeat players are advantaged. My
study, therefore, contributes to law and society scholarship on
studies of the law in action (Macaulay 1963), dispute resolution in
organizations (Edelman and Suchman 1999; Galanter and Lande
1992), repeat players advantages in disputing forums (Galanter
1974), and access to justice (Felstiner et al. 1980–81). In particular,
this study fits within the long socio-legal tradition of exploring the
gap between the law on the books and law in action but also builds on
this tradition by examining the meaning-making activities of organizations as they adjudicate public legal rights in third-party forums
they create. In this instance, the law in action as presented at training
sites becomes and replaces the law on the books in manufacturersponsored dispute resolution programs. In doing so, my study
answers socio-legal scholars, who have for the past two decades,
called for more empirical studies of how organizational governance
structures operate in action (Edelman and Suchman 1999; Galanter
and Lande 1992; Macaulay 1986). Also, contrary to most studies that
demonstrate how repeat players gain advantages in disputing
structures, my comparative research design allows me to explore
how dispute resolution structures can also inhibit repeat player
advantages.
My study also extends the neo-institutional literature on law
and organizations by examining how law is constructed within
different dispute resolution structures. I reveal the microprocesses and mechanisms through which law shapes meaning in
these different dispute resolution structures, even as meaning
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in these structures reshape law. In contrast to prior studies
(Edelman et al. 1993; Edelman et al. 2001; Marshall 2005), my
comparative qualitative design allowed me to analyze variation in
how managerial values flow into law. Finally, unlike prior studies
that show how managerial values influence written policies and
internal legal structures (Edelman et al. 1993; Marshall 2005),
here, managerial logics flow into third-party organizations that
train arbitrators on the meaning of lemon laws. This is a critical
and as yet unrecognized way by which the “haves” gain structural
advantages through seemingly neutral dispute resolution processes (cf. Galanter 1974).
This study also has critical policy implications for consumers’
access to justice and more broadly, for the civil justice system.
Arbitration and alternative adjudicatory processes are generally a
subset of the civil justice system that has been declared a neutral
and independent adjudicatory body by legislatures and even by
the United States Supreme Court.19 The legitimacy of arbitration
is based on a widely held belief that independent arbitrator training organizations can teach arbitrators to be impartial and
neutral. Moreover, internal grievance and alternative dispute
resolution processes generally operate with a “consensus” rather
than “adversary” philosophy (Bush 1989; Bush and Folger 1994).
As a result, these structures allow greater opportunity for individual voice in the process, increase access to justice for parties
who want to avoid the delay and expense of the court system, and
eliminate repeat players’ ability to develop a body of favorable
precedent.
But this comparative study highlights the difficulties of contracting out an interest-neutral activity such as adjudicating public
legal rights to private organizations anchored in a non-neutral
business logic. My empirical data suggest that these consumer
dispute resolution structures differ substantially with respect to:
(1) how they filter competing business and consumer logics; and
(2) how well they protect and preserve the consensus values of
informal dispute resolution. In this instance, the structure of
dispute resolution may determine whether consumers gain meaningful access to justice outside the court system (cf. Sandefur
2008).
To the extent consumer protection laws are undermined by
business norms in various private disputing forums, these policies
may be ineffective in ameliorating social and economic disadvan19
The United States Supreme Court indicates: “The streamlined procedures of arbitration do not entail any consequential restrictions on substantive rights” Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987); see also AT & T v. Concepcion LLC, 131
S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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tages for consumers. This is especially important because consumers, employees, shareholders, and health care patients are increasingly channeled, with the blessing of legislatures and courts, into
alternative dispute resolution structures operating outside formal
legal institutions. Because the civil and consumer rights revolutions
of the 1960s have been re-routed into a variety of different organizational dispute resolution structures, future studies should
examine variation in how these structures operate, how these structures give different meanings to law, and what effect different
structures have on procedural fairness and substantive justice for
parties.20

Rethinking Organizational Governance in the 21st Century

Although this article focuses on public and private dispute
resolution structures in the context of consumer warranty laws,
scholars would be well served to examine other structures like
these that affect consumers, especially in the area of financial and
capital markets governance. The global financial crisis highlights
the need for more analysis of how businesses construct the
meaning of compliance sometimes in ways that may undermine
legal regulation. Just as managerial and business logics transformed consumer rights in this study, corporate culture and institutionalized practices impacted the regulation of financial and
lending institutions in the recent banking crisis. In particular, deference to corporate and financial institution lending practices,
disclosure policies, internal compliance structures, auditing, and
reporting systems amidst a push for flexible, collaborative regulation and delegated governance failed to sufficiently protect consumers and investors from excessive fiscal risk-taking policies
(Edelman and Talesh 2011; Krawiec 2003; O’Brien 2007).
Although these corporate structures may be adopted to signal compliance and ethical conduct by corporations, the recent financial
crisis demonstrates that such institutionalized structures may
provide little guarantee that financial fraud and abuse will not
occur. Because laws regulating organizations are often ambiguous
with respect to their meaning, future studies should focus empirical analysis on how organizational forms of compliance can end up
constructing the actual meaning of compliance in ways that are

20
In this sense, this article reveals a subtle form of industry capture that policymakers
may want to focus on. Unlike the traditional account of regulatory capture, organizations
are not co-opting existing regulatory institutions. Instead, organizations are creating their
own dispute resolution institutions and using training processes to institutionalize a version
of the lemon law that is infused with business values.
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inconsistent with regulatory goals. Understanding the processes by
which private organizations operate governance structures and
shape the content and meaning of laws designed to regulate them
will allow for more sophisticated policy design and informed
legislative and judicial decisions.
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